New governance theory has a large following in academia and is influential in numerous spheres of regulatory policy. 1 Yet in the area of occupational health and safety, new governance is hardly new at all. Indeed, it is fair to say that it in many ways what are now labelled new governance concepts were first articulated and applied in the 1972
Robens Report, Safety and Health at Work. This included its critique of command and control legislation and its emphasis on the development of better self--regulation. 2 Thus it is particularly fitting that we return to Theo Nichols and Pete Armstrong's early critique of the Robens Report for some old lessons for new governance in occupational health and safety (OHS) regulation. While much of their monograph criticized the Robens Report for blaming apathy as the underlying source of workplace injuries (which justified its call for more self--regulation), Nichols and Armstrong's response was that a proper understanding of risk creation had to take as its starting point the pressure for production generated within capitalist relations of production. From their political economy perspective, the central regulatory problem was how to counteract the pressure to prioritize production over safety, and their solution required shifting power over production to workers on the shop floor. 3 Clearly, the terms of the debate over OHS regulation have not remained static in the nearly forty years that have passed since their intervention; nor have the economic, 1 For a critical discussion of the roots of governance theory and its dispersion across policy networks, see Jonathan S. Davies, Challenging Governance Theory (Bristol: Polity Press, 2011 political and social conditions of production. Thus the goal of this chapter is to follow the growth and development of new governance thinking about OHS, but at the same time, and in the spirit of Nichols and Armstrong, to critically examine the underlying assumptions new governance theorists make about the world and the implications for their prescriptions if they are wrong, and to consider alternative reforms that focus on building public regulatory capacity.
The chapter proceeds in four parts. In the first, I construct some ideal types of OHS regimes based on three variables; state protection, worker participation and employer management systems. These are used as heuristics in subsequent discussion. The second part briefly discusses the roots of new governance in the Robens report (referred to as 'old' new governance) and briefly reviews Ontario's experience with it, to illuminate its dynamics and its vulnerability to regress toward neo--liberal self regulation/paternalism in the absence of effective worker OHS activism . In part three, I focus on recent work by two North American new governance theorists, Orly Lobel and Cynthia Estlund, who consciously wish to avoid a collapse of new governance approaches into neo--liberal self regulation/paternalism. I argue that despite their aspirations, the new governance prescriptions they embrace are unlikely to be institutionalized with the protective conditions they advocate and that their emphasis on self--regulation valorizes a movement toward the destination they wish to avoid. Finally, I ask whether degradation toward neo--liberal self--regulation/paternalism is inevitable and, if not, whether a progressive new governance theory that aims to strengthen a regime of public regulation under the unfavourable conditions that prevail today provides a better alternative.
Constructing Ideal Types
For the purpose of locating new governance theories of OHS regulation within a range of possible configurations, it will be useful to construct some ideal types of regimes.
In the past, I attempted to map out regimes of OHS regulation using two axes, state protection and worker participation. 4 The focus of that study was on worker citizenship in the OHS regimes, not with OHS regulation more generally. That approach left out an important dimension of current regulatory practice, promotion of employer OHS management, which must be brought in if we are going to investigate new governance's emphasis on self--regulation. The term "OHS management" as used here does not refer specifically to the presence or absence of an occupational health and safety management systems defined as a "systematic managerial process to detect, abate and prevent workplace hazards." 5 Rather, it refers to state policies that support the development of employer competence and commitment to manage OHS (other than by command and control regulation or strengthening worker participation). This might include education and promotional activities, support for the formation of sectoral safety associations and the use of economic incentives in the workers' compensation system, including experience and merit rating. For the purposes of constructing ideal types I have adopted a binary weak/strong assessment for each element, although obviously this is a gross oversimplification that ignores the enormous variation within actual regimes based on industry, region, etc. Table   1 presents the eight logically possible combinations. Table 1 : Ideal Types of OHS Regimes I am not particularly concerned to defend the labels I have attached to these ideal types but perhaps it is worth briefly explaining my thinking on them. The regimes can be divided into two clusters based on whether there is weak or strong state protection.
Beginning with the former, in a laissez--faire or neo--liberal regime, the state does not actively support any of the three dimensions of OHS regulation. In this regime, it is unlikely that employer provision of high quality work environments will spontaneously emerge, notwithstanding the business--case arguments that are often made for it. 6 The historical evidence for laissez--faire regimes that dominated much of the nineteenth century supports this view; workers were routinely exposed to highly dangerous conditions in mines, factories, and railways and suffered high rates of injury, disease and death. 7 A similar conclusion can be reached about OHS management in a neo--liberal world when union representation and state regulation are declining and production is increasingly organized through diffuse contractual networks rather direct management of employees. 8 For this reason, most states have chosen to intervene on at least one of the three dimensions of regulation. The regime that deviates least from the ideology and practice of laissez--faire or neo--liberalism operates by only promoting employer OHS management, typically through some combination of educational activities, support for the formation of employer safety associations, and the use of economic incentives in a workers' compensation system. I have labelled this kind of regime "paternalist promotional" insofar as it does not provide workers with any rights and operates primarily by encouraging management to behave responsibly. Arguably, this approach prevailed in the regulation of farm worker safety in Ontario before the occupational health and safety act was extended to agriculture in 2006. Farm workers neither enjoyed an entitlement to minimum OHS standards nor a right to participate in OHS management, but they were covered by the workers' compensation system, which supported a farm safety association and farm employers were experienced rated and so had economic incentives to reduce claims costs.
Not surprisingly, this OHS regime performed poorly. 9 A third regime in this cluster is one built primarily on strong worker participation rights that enable workers to exert a significant level of influence on and, perhaps, control over decision making that affects health and safety conditions at work. Strong worker participation regimes must be distinguished from weaker involvement schemes that are likely to be largely cosmetic and aim to secure worker compliance with management objectives. 10 It is possible that strong worker participation will emerge in the absence of active state support where there is widespread and effective worker self--organization, but it is more common for participation rights to become generalized and entrenched through legislation requiring safety representatives and joint health and safety committees (JHSC). 11 It is difficult, however, to think of any state which has constructed an OHS regime primarily around strong worker participation. A more common route for states that wish to limit direct state regulation but hope to improve OHS outcomes is one I have labelled a collective laissez--faire regime. The term pushing the government to strengthen worker participation rights, even if only in the direction of better institutionalizing worker voice in the IRS and the ERS but without giving workers more power. Finally, the election of a so--called labour--friendly government did not guarantee that labour--friendly policies and practices would be implemented. As a result, continued worker mobilization and pressure was essential to prevent regulatory backsliding. Finally, as worker OHS activism declined, the regime slipped back towards paternalism.
'New' New Governance The Robens Report's emphasis on the limited capacity of the state and the need to promote more responsible self--regulation lies at the heart of new governance theory, which has since been elaborated and given additional theoretical justifications. When addressing the limits of traditional command and control regulation, new governance theorists emphasize the growing complexity of the external environment and the increasing speed of technological and organizational innovation. This, they argue, overloads the capacity of states to gather and process the information necessary to develop effective regulations. They also emphasize that processes of globalization are hollowing out the ability of national states to effectively regulate globalized activities and that supra--national regulatory institutions are too underdeveloped to fill the void. Moreover, they posit that command and control strategies are self--defeating. The imposition of substantive standards creates rigidities both in law and in the social fields that regulation is attempting to control. Existing regulation is likely to become quickly outdated and irrelevant, producing both the phenomenon of over--regulation of old hazards and under--regulation of new and emerging ones. Finally, the targets of regulation increasingly resist what regulation there is and oppose new regulation, thus further limiting the state's capacity to respond to changes in the work environment, rendering it even less effective.
In short, they say, we have a vicious circle. Not only does command and control regulation impair the capacity and motivation of private actors to solve problems on their own and reduce economic efficiency, but it also fails to achieve its normative goals. Workers and employers are both made worse off. 25 Much of this narrative might also fit within a neo--liberal critique of traditional regulation, but new governance theorists insist they are not abandoning the normative goal of improved OHS outcomes to the naked pursuit of efficiency within an increasingly competitive global economy. Rather, they claim that new governance theory provides an approach to regulation that steers a third--way between command--and--control regulation, on the one hand, and neo--liberalism, on the other. A variety of names have been appended to this approach including reflexive regulation; responsive regulation and regulated self--regulation, amongst others. 26 Although there are variations in emphasis, the focus of new governance is on steering corporate governance or management systems in socially desirable directions -other than by simply commanding them to behave in a prescribed ways. It is posited that law can facilitate more cooperative processes that are flexible, responsive and participatory, and that align the firm's interests with substantive regulatory 25 The literature is vast. I have tended to focus on North American contributors, particularly Lobel and Estlund, whose work will be discussed in more detail, infra. prosecutions are rare. Moreover, the new world of work is increasing the difficulty of regulation because of accelerating innovation, vertical disintegration of firms and the corresponding growth of complex supply chains, and the challenge of addressing injuries that arise not from trauma but from job stresses and strains. What then is to be done? The overarching objective is to make OHS a shared interest that can be integrated into the core ends of economic enterprises. Regulatory agencies can achieve this by identifying the conditions under which effective self regulation works, promoting their development, and recognizing when those conditions are absent. 29 Taking the case of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
Lobel identifies a number of voluntary compliance programs developed in the 1980s and 90s that signalled a shift away from command and control to a new governance model that fostered public/private partnership, encouraged industry cooperation, and allowed flexibility in policy implementation. 30 However, she is also keenly aware that such a shift can also provide a cover for neo--liberal deregulation by allowing firms to escape even a weak threat of sanction for failure to achieve politically established regulatory standards. 31 Therefore, Lobel argues, institutional arrangements must be put into place to avoid this result, and she identifies two principles, exit and voice, to guide this exercise. The exit principle requires the creation of a dual--track system of enforcement and sanctions so that firms are faced with a clear choice: if they fail to responsibly self regulate, they will be made subject to an effective, coercive command and control regime of enforcement. 32 This is consistent with the position Lobel adopted in an earlier article, which identified three overarching projects intertwined in new governance theory: economic efficiency, political legitimacy and social democracy. Lobel noted that choices must be made and balances struck between these projects, but explicitly adopted a social democratic perspective, insisting that substantive commitments to the achievement of public ends must be maintained. 33 But how difficult will that be? The answer will depend to a great degree on the view taken of regulatory dilemmas in OHS and their resolution. 34 In the political economy tradition, exemplified by Nichols and Armstrong, OHS regulation is seen as a realm of recurring regulatory dilemmas that stem from the relentless requirement within capitalism to produce for profit. will be more inclined to coregulate the work environment since they can be assured that their competitors will not gain an edge by producing less safely but more cheaply. Swedish models of OHS regulation in the 1970s and 1980s arguably went some way toward meeting this condition but as Swedish capital became more globalized in recent decades, workplace organization at the national level is less able to reduce competitive pressures. 37 New governance theorists are not insensitive to the existence of conflicts of interest and unequal power relations but, like 'old' new governance theory, they generally seek to minimize their salience and avoid the need for trade--offs. The assumption of common interests in OHS deeply informed the Robens Report. "Indeed, there is a greater natural affinity of interest between 'the two sides' in relation to safety and health problems than in most other matters. There is no legitimate scope for 'bargaining' on safety and health issues, but much scope for constructive discussion, joint inspection, and participation in working out solutions." 38 It is notable that Robens put the terms 'the two sides' and 'bargaining' in parentheses, seemingly to emphasize his doubt that there really were two sides that had something to bargain over. 39 The report recommended worker participation, not to act as a check on management's penchant to stint on OHS, but rather to Earlier in her article Lobel also addressed this issue in developing an argument that firms operated pursuant to a mixed set of motivations. However, even within that context, Lobel emphasized the business case for safety, taking into account the reduction of accident costs, including improved worker morale, reduced absenteeism, and consumer preference for goods and services that are produced safely. 43 This last point links to an argument often found in 'new' new governance theory about the significance of reputational risk as a driver of firm behaviour. Here the argument is that a poor health and safety performance will negatively affect the firm's bottom line either because consumers will avoid its products or because other firms will not wish to do business with unsafe firms. Safety pays, at least most of the time, reducing the need to confront trade--offs between economic efficiency (profit) and social democratic values (worker safety). The assumption of common interests between workers and employers built on the business case for safety has a long history in OHS regulation going back to the 40 Robens, para. 59. This view also informed the Ham Report which asserted (at 250) that health and safety was not a suitable issue for collective bargaining 41 See Davies, Challenging Governance, who also emphasizes the ways in which governance and network theorists reject the continuing salience of class and class-based conflict. 42 Lobel, "Interlocking," 1128. Notably the additional sources in her footnote on this point (fn. 274), do not for the most part provide empirical support for the common interest proposition. 43 Ibid., 1102.
factory acts and has often provided the basis for a subtle renorming of its objects toward the elimination of those risks that are excessive -from a business perspective. 44 Notwithstanding the persistence of business case arguments, often found on government websites, the empirical evidence supporting the business case has been subject to much criticism and its limits identified. 45 In addition to discounting the extent to which OHS conflicts with the profit motive, new governance theorists also tend to minimize the strength of the profit motive when conflicts do arise. In particular, there appears to be a high level of faith in the likelihood that virtue will triumph over self--interest. For example, in a recent discussion of restorative justice in the OHS context, Braithwaite describes restorative justice as a process that is "about sitting in a circle discussing who has been hurt and then the victim being able to describe in their own words how they are coping with the hurt and what they are looking for to repair that harm and prevent it from happening again. It is about the virtue of active responsibility as opposed to passive responsibility of holding someone responsible for what they have done in the past." If no one takes responsibility the circle is widened until a "softer target" -presumably the virtuous actor -is hit. 46 Lobel also picks up on this strain of the new governance theory when she argues that "a cooperative governance framework can create empathy and mutual trust among diverse people. Moreover, as Harry Glasbeek notes, "Given the corporation's recent historical role in the jettisoning of such job and income security as had been won...why should anyone believe that there will be a corporate drive to give back some of these gains? There is a limit to the extent that managers can indulge their personal sense of altruism and/or worker friendliness and still be true to their real task." 50 And that real task, as corporate law scholars will tell you, is maximization of shareholder value, with all it entails. 51 Because Lobel minimizes the salience of conflict and regulatory dilemmas, the OHS policy prescriptions she favours are problematic. Lobel endorses OSHA's efforts to promote cooperative compliance through a variety of two--track programs that exempt qualifying firms from regular inspections, although she recognizes that in the absence of a strong commitment to command and control regulation for firms that do not qualify for dialogue in which she tries, with only partial success, to convince herself that this is possible.
Her considerable reservations about new governance prescriptions derive from her better understanding of and greater focus on the realities of unequal power relations in the workplace than Lobel's. For example, although she treats OHS as an area in which there are sometimes common interests, and argues that common interests are more likely to exist in OHS than, for example, minimum wage or hours of work laws, she also recognizes that there will be occasions when "hazards...are integral to the production process and...serve the employer's bottom line" and that sometimes "health and safety improvements come with a significant price tag." 54 Because of a greater sensitivity to salience of power imbalances in the workplace, Estlund recognizes the vulnerability of employee committees to cooptation and intimidation given the fear of retaliation and job loss, even for unionized employees. 55 Moreover, she also recognizes that internal committees are unlikely to effectively address hazards when they conflict with profit--making. So while safety committees can assist in some ways, for example, by aggregating and articulating employee knowledge about hazardous conditions where lack of communication is part of the problem, they need to operate in conjunction with some outside entity "that can supply power, independence, and backed by meaningful inspection will often be required to achieve effective supply chain regulation. 58 The alternative of depending on workers to blow the whistle on their employers is also problematic. Most health and safety acts currently protect workers against retaliation for exercising their statutory rights, including the right to refuse unsafe work, as well as to make complaints, but in the absence of a strong union most workers are unlikely to be assertive protagonists. This is amply illustrated by Neil Gunningham's recent work on the Australian mining industry which draws a very pessimistic view about the effectiveness of worker participation in a cold industrial relations climate. 59 This returns Estlund to the conundrum of requiring the presence of the very conditions she stipulates as absent to make her alterative effective. As she recognizes, in their absence neo--liberal or paternalist regimes of regulation are far more probable outcomes than social democratic ones.
To the extent that the response to this weakness is the presence of a strong enforcement track that would induce firms to sign up to avoid facing its teeth, it presupposes the existence of one of the conditions whose absence has been identified as a driver of the turn to regulated self--regulation. If regulators lack the capacity both to identify which firms genuinely are on the right track and to detect OHS violations and appropriately sanction firms on the wrong track, regulated self--regulation is quite likely to degrade into neo--liberal self regulation/paternalism. 60 Although it is true that there has been an increase in employment litigation in the United States, it is hard to imagine that most workers, let alone vulnerable workers, are likely to benefit from private rights of action or that they will be an effective substitute for adequate public compensation and enforcement regimes. So while there are differences among 'new' new governance theorists, the dominant tendency is to dissolve safety--profit conflicts by assuming common interests prevail and to minimize the extent to which profit--seeking behaviour will take precedence over safety considerations when conflicts do arise by assuming that virtue will tend to trump self--interest. While more social democratic new governance theorists are quite cognizant that under conditions of unequal power relations new governance techniques face severe challenges and could be used to further disempower the weak, their call for safeguards still leaves in place a core agenda that favours more self--regulation and reliance on non--state actors. Moreover, they have already found that the safeguards they insist upon, state enforcement and worker voice, are irretrievably in decline. As a result, their shift in emphasis, from public to private systems of regulation, may actually increase the likelihood 60 Estlund, Regoverning, 233-34.
that enforcement deficits will be exacerbated rather than redressed. 61 In that vein, Davies argues that the promotion of new governance theory can be fruitfully understood as a dimension of neoliberal hegemonic project that aims to secure consent through participation and the promotion of common interests, while the practice of new governance fails to deliver a new cooperative social order because it is undermined by the neoliberal material conditions in which new governance practices are enacted. 62 Alternative Paths Clearly, one path of new governance practice is toward more self governance, with the real danger that it will produce neo--liberal or at best paternalist regimes. As Tombs and Whyte have demonstrated, this is the path that has been followed in the UK. 63 From
Estlund's perspective, the self--regulation train has left the station and so there is no alternative but to work within that framework and try to steer it toward more worker protection. If that is true, then indeed our options are limited and the prospects for regulatory renewal are dismal. The question I want to pose here is whether there are alternative paths, and if so, whether a progressive new governance theory has anything to offer. My answer to both these questions is a tentative yes; that a regime that maintains a strong public enforcement focus is still possible and that a theory that focuses on ways to mobilize civil society forces in aid of public enforcement can indeed make a contribution to the development of effective OHS regulation in the context of the new world of work. First, in regard to the possibility of regulatory alternatives that retain a strong public enforcement component, let us return to the case of Ontario. As we saw earlier, at the beginning of the 1990s it was looking as if the regime of mandated partial self--regulation was going to degrade as state enforcement was ebbing and worker OHS activism was subsiding. Subsequent events, however, tell a more complicated story, one that points to the possibility that the trajectory of public enforcement is not necessarily downward sloping, even under unfavourable political and economic conditions. In 1995 an ideologically right wing government was elected and it attacked collective bargaining and employment standards laws. But it did not go after OHS. Indeed, Newmarket, Ontario. The charge was laid in 2004 and was resolved by a plea deal in which the criminal charge was dropped in exchange for a guilty plea to violations under the OHS statute. 68 The second criminal prosecution in Ontario was launched against Millenium
Crane, the company's owner, and the crane operator at the time. In this case too the charges were dropped after an engineering report failed to support the prosecution's case. 69 The third prosecution, which is pending at the time of writing, arose out of a scaffolding collapse that killed four workers on Christmas Eve 2009. The accused include the Metron Construction Co. and three of its officials. 70 In Quebec two criminal cases have resulted in convictions. In Transpavé Inc., involving a workplace fatality, the accused pleaded guilty and was fined $110,000.00. 71 The first conviction after a trial was obtained against Pasquale Scrocca, a landscape contractor. In that case, an employee died when the brakes on a backhoe Mr. Scrocca was driving failed, pinning the employee against a wall. Scrocca received a conditional sentence of imprisonment for two years less a day to be served in the community. 72 One case, R. v.
Gagné, Steve
Lemieux and Simon Gagné, ended with an acquittal. In that case, charges were laid following a collision between a train and a maintenance vehicle, which resulted in one death and three injuries. The two accused individuals were employees of Québec--Cartier:
Steve Lemieux, was the train operator, and Simon Gagné, was a foreman. Justice Dionne found that the mistakes made by the employees arose from a corporate culture of tolerance and deficient training, not wanton and reckless disregard for the lives and safety of workers on the part of the accused. In principle, this finding could have resulted in a conviction of the corporation, but it had not been charged. 73 There is at least one case still pending, against Mark Hritchuk, the service manager at a car dealership, where an employee died after catching fire due to a broken fuel pump. 74 Finally 2001. Senior managers were more directly involved in safety, safety was more likely to be included in managerial job descriptions, and more safety training was provided to workers. 84 It is also possible that increased experience rating has created an economic incentive to better manage safety, although the evidence is decidedly mixed with studies
showing that the most frequent response of employers is to control claims cost, often through aggressive claims management. 85 On the other hand, the growth of small business and de--centralized production is likely to have had a negative impact on the overall capacity of employers to manage OHS. 86 The Dean Report also made some recommendations to enhance employer capacity, competence and commitment to manage OHS risks. These include mandatory OHS training for supervisors responsible for frontline workers, an accreditation system for employers that successfully implement OHS management systems, appropriate financial incentives for firms that qualify suppliers based on their OHS performance, and more compliance assistance from inspectors. It also made recommendations aimed at improving compliance in the small business sector. Importantly, none of the proposals are offered as alternatives to strong enforcement and worker participation. For example, there is no suggestion that accredited employers should be exempt from routine inspections and the report is clear that more compliance assistance "should not interfere with the inspector's duty to enforce the law." Moreover, the report also recognizes that financial incentives should not be based primarily on claims cost and frequency. 87 The relevance of Ontario's recent OHS regime lies in the fact that it provides evidence that neo--liberal self regulation/paternalism is not the inevitable destination of Robens style regimes. Indeed, it indicates that after a regime starts down the neo--liberal path, as was the case in Ontario (ironically under the auspices of a labour friendly government), its direction can be changed, even with a conservative government in power.
It is beyond the scope of this intervention to endeavour to provide an explanation for this development, 88 other than to suggest that perhaps in some way the assignment of deputizing persons associated with workers' organizations to designating workers' organizations as sites where workers can anonymously register complaints to having workers' organizations provide enforcers with intelligence that would assist them in identifying high risk employers or industries.
In some ways, their proposal resembles the Swedish regional safety representative system, except that the focus here is much less on providing assistance to the IRS than on strengthening the ERS. It is also a model that can be used by unionized workers in their own workplaces. For example, the Canadian Auto Workers recently reported on the efforts of a local that represents federally regulated workers in the airline industry to build relationships with federal OHS inspectors so that they can more easily be called upon to intervene when the union is unable to secure satisfactory responses from their employers. 93 The approach advocated by Fine and Gordon faces many obstacles and may not be realized except on an exceptional basis. Nevertheless, the priority given to building pubic enforcement and enhancing worker participation --that is toward building a worker democratic regime --arguably has more potential in the long run than a 'new' new governance alternative that relegates these elements to a secondary and supporting role in a regime that gives primacy to employer self--regulation. 
Conclusion

